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California's Sexually Violent Predator
Act: The Role of Psychiatrists, Courts,
and Medical Determinations in
Confining Sex Offenders
by CAROLYN B. RAmSEY*
Introduction
In the past few years, the California Legislature has attempted to
weave a tight web of laws to protect society, and especially children,
from sexual predators.' One of these laws, the Sexually Violent
Predator Act ("SVPA"), 2 which provides for involuntary civil commit-
ment, targets sex offenders nearing the end of their prison terms. The
SVPA is a stop-gap, born of ineffective criminal sentencing and a trou-
bled parole system. Its chief targets are not new offenders, but poten-
tial recidivists sentenced years ago.' Such individuals pose a dilemma
* B.A., University of California, Irvine (1990); A.M., Stanford University (1991);
J.D. with Distinction, Stanford Law School (1998). Ms. Ramsey is clerking for the Honor-
able Paul J. Kelly, Jr., on the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1998-
99. She will clerk for the Honorable Marilyn Hall Patel, Chief Judge, Northern District of
California, in 1999-2000. She would like to thank Professor Robert Weisberg for comment-
ing on the first draft of this article.
1. See CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE §§ 6600-08 (West 1996) (providing for the involun-
tary civil commitment of mentally-disordered sexual predators); CAL. PENAL CODE § 645
(West 1998) (providing for discretionary imposition of chemical castration as a condition of
parole for first-time offenders and mandatory chemical castration for second-time offend-
ers); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.71 (West 1998) (mandating sentence of 25-years to life for
certain first-time rapists and child molesters ); CAL- PENAL CODE § 667.61 (repealed 1997)
(mandating indeterminate sentences for first-time sex offenders).
2. See CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE §§ 6600-08.
3. Notably, under the SVPA, the crime for which the offender is being punished at
the time of his commitment can be non-sexual as long as he has committed acts of sexual
violence in the past. For example, the appellant in Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584
(Cal. 1999), was serving a sentence for false imprisonment. However, he had a long history
of sexual predation, beginning with a conviction in 1973 for one count of sodomy and one
count of assault with intent to commit rape. He was confined at the state hospital at Atas-
cadero, where he received both individual and group therapy until 1979. After his release,
his doctors discovered that he was offending again and had him recommitted to Atas-
cadero in 1981. The following year, he was convicted and sentenced to a long prison term.
See id. at 591. Shortly after being paroled in 1990, he abducted a female jogger and was
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because changing the sentencing laws does not affect them unless they
commit new atrocities upon release.
An arsenal of constitutional challenges has been raised and re-
jected with regard to involuntary commitment laws in other states.
However, there has been little, if any, discussion of California's SVPA,
and critiques of other states' laws offer few constructive solutions.4
The existing scholarship, written before the U.S. Supreme Court's af-
firmation of a similar Kansas statute in 1997, admits the horrors of
sexual violence but sticks to a negative brand of constitutionalism that
gives lawmakers little aid in drafting statutes.5 This article takes a dif-
ferent course. It recognizes the need for two legislative approaches-
one for dangerous persons nearing the end of their prison terms and
another for new crimes at the guilt phase. The SVPA deals with the
first problem. The guilty but mentally ill ("GBMI") verdict offers a
strategy for approaching the second.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v. Hendricks6 and
the recent affirmation of the SVPA by the California appellate bench
in Hubbart v. Superior Court7 indicate that, at least on its face, the
sent to prison on the false imprisonment charge. See id. Two practicing psychiatrists deter-
mined that Hubbart had a diagnosable mental disorder that presented a high risk that he
would engage in acts of sexual violence if he were not in custody. See id.
4. Compare Brian G. Bodine, Comment, Washington's New Violent Sexual Predator
Commitment System: An Unconstitutional Law and an Unwise Policy Choice, 14 U. PUGET
SouND L. REv. 105 (1990) (criticizing a similar Washington law for its alleged violations of
the Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses); Beth
Keiko Fujimoto, Comment, Sexual Violence, Sanity, and Safety: Constitutional Parameters
for Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 15 U. PUGET SoUND L. REv. 879
(1992) (arguing that the Washington law is unconstitutional on several grounds and that
sex offenders cannot be treated); and Eric S. Janus, Sex Offender Commitments: Debunking
the Official Narrative and Revealing the Rules-in-Use, 8 STAN. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 71 (1997)
(attempting to expose the chicanery of a variety of civil commitment statutes that claim to
offer civil remedies but which, in Janus' view, actually serve punitive ends) with Katherine
P. Blakey, The Indefinite Civil Commitment of Dangerous Sex Offenders Is An Appropriate
Legal Compromise Between "Mad" and "Bad"--A Study of Minnesota's Sexual Psycho-
pathic Personality Statute, 10 NoRE DAiM J.L. ETcs & PUB. POL'Y 227 (1996) (offering
a positive view of Minnesota's sexual offender commitment law) and Kelly A. McCaffrey,
Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators in Kansas: A Modern Law
for Modern Times, 42 U. KAN. L. Rnv. 887 (1994) (foreshadowing the Supreme Court's
affirmation of the Kansas law in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)).
5. See generally Bodine supra note 4; Fujimoto, supra note 4; Janus, supra note 4, but
see Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (foreclosing many of the arguments raised in
opposition to civil commitment laws). Although each of these writers makes a case for the
unconstitutionality of civil commitment statutes, none of them offers a satisfactory method
of combating the threat of sexual predation, and none discusses California's SVPA.
6. 521 U.S. 346 (holding that a similar statute in Kansas did not violate the substan-
tive Due Process, Double Jeopardy, or Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Constitution).
7. 969 P.2d 584, 611 (Cal. 1999).
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SVPA is constitutional. However, unresolved questions about the
SVPA's therapeutic provisions may prevent it from functioning effec-
tively as a civil remedy. This article argues that the Act must be un-
derpinned by bona fide individualized treatment programs to fulfill its
ostensible purpose of treating sex offenders, as well as keeping them
off the streets. Sections 6606(a) and 6606(c) of the SVPA instruct the
Department of Mental Health to "afford the person with treatment
for his or her diagnosed mental disorder" based on a "structured
treatment protocol" and to provide such a program in "facilities...
consistent with current institutional standards."' However, critics
have suggested that the SVPA and comparable laws in other states use
treatment as a fig leaf for extended punishment.9 Those responsible
for the implementation of the SVPA need to disprove such criticisms.
Yet, in attempting to do so, they face uncertainties about the
treatability of disorders that lead to sexual violence and the constitu-
tionality of potentially successful therapies.
Part One of this article discusses the constitutionality of the
SVPA in light of Hendricks and Hubbart. Part Two argues that sex
offenders have a right to be treated but not cured. The courts in Hen-
dricks and Hubbart blithely accepted legislative characterizations of
the Kansas and California laws as civil, rather than penal."° Yet, while
the wording of the SVPA disavows any punitive purpose," the Cali-
fornia Legislature must convert the guarantee of individualized treat-
ment necessary to avoid double jeopardy and ex post facto violations
into a reality in the state's mental institutions. This task is especially
difficult because psychiatrists disagree about which treatments, if any,
8. CAL. WEre. & INST. CODE § 6606(a)-(c).
9. See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (opining that the fail-
ure of the state of Kansas to provide any treatment convinced the dissent that the statute
"was not simply an effort to commit Hendricks civilly, but rather an effort to inflict further
punishment upon him"); Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744,753 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (hold-
ing a similar Washington statute unconstitutional because, inter alia, "[t]he Statute is inex-
tricably linked to the traditional goals of punishment, because it requires, on its face, that
the detainee serve his entire criminal sentence before being committed or treated."); State
v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 138 (Wis. 1995) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
clear punitive purpose of the Wisconsin statute was to prevent sexual predators from reof-
fending by lengthening their incarceration). See also Fujimoto, supra note 4, at 906-08
(contending that treatment is impossible because no known treatment for sex offenders
exists).
10. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361; Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 605-06 (quoting Hendricks:
"Courts should 'ordinarily defer' to statements in the legislative record indicating that a
measure is not penal in nature.")
11. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6250 (characterizing sexually violent
predators "not as criminals, but as sick persons").
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are appropriate to the paraphilias 12 and personality disorders from
which sex offenders suffer.'" This article contends that the right to
refuse medical treatment should not raise impediments to measures,
such as chemical castration, which may be the only hope for the even-
tual reintegration of persons committed under the SVPA into our
society.
Finally, Part Three suggests that the manipulation of medical dis-
course in the involuntary commitment debate exposes the inadequacy
of existing mechanisms for categorizing madness and badness. States
such as California that use the capacity to differentiate between right
and wrong as a test of criminal responsibility must remedy the uncom-
fortable fit between their sexual predator statutes and the insanity de-
fense. The California Penal Code explicitly provides that the insanity
defense "shall not be found ... solely on the basis of a personality or
adjustment disorder."' 4 Under the SVPA, however, such a disorder
combined with a finding of dangerousness may lead to indefinite con-
finement in a mental hospital, in addition to a prison sentence. This
inconsistency suggests the need for a third category between guilty
and not guilty by reason of insanity ("NGRI"). Individuals in this
middle ground (i.e. those who have mental abnormalities but who un-
12. Paraphilias are forms of sexual disorder described in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MErTAL
DISORDERs 522-23 (American Psychiatric Association, 4th ed. 1994) (hereinafter "DSM-
IV"). The DSM-IV classification of "paraphilia" requires the occurrence over a period of
at least six months of "recurrent, sexually arousing fantasies or sexual urges generally in-
volving 1) non-human objects, 2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one's partner, or
3) children or nonconsenting persons." It does not require that the subject act on his urges.
See idL See also Brief of the Washington State Psychiatric Association in Support of Re-
spondent, 1996 WL 468611, at *20, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (Nos. 95-1649,
95-9075) (hereinafter "WSPA Brief'). Deviant sexual behaviors due to mental retarda-
tion, dementia, substance abuse, mania, and schizophrenia are not included under the ru-
bric of paraphilia. See Brief of the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers in
Support of Petitioner, 1996 WL 471027, at *6, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)
(Nos. 95-1649, 95-9075) (hereinafter "ATSA Brief'). At least three severe types of
paraphilia constitute mental abnormalities within the meaning of the Kansas statute (and
would be considered "mental disorders" under the California SVPA): (1) pedophilia, (2)
sexual sadism; and (3) "paraphilia not otherwise specified-rape." Id. at **7-8.
13. Some sex offenders suffer from Antisocial Personality Disorder ("APD"), in addi-
tion to one or more paraphllas. For example, in State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115 (Wis. 1995),
one defendant, who was charged with two counts of first degree sexual assault, robbery and
false imprisonment after kidnapping women in shopping malls, suffered primarily from
APD and secondarily from a paraphilia. See id. at 119. The other defendant in Post suf-
fered from two paraphilias-sexual sadism and exhibitionism-and only secondarily from
APD. See iL The second defendant was charged with kidnapping and sexual assault. See
id. at 119-20.
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25.5 (West Supp. 1999).
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derstand that their behavior is wrong) would be eligible for both crim-
inal punishment and psychiatric therapy.
I. The Turf War Between The Courts And The Psychiatric
Profession: Why The SVPA Has Survived
Constitutional Challenges
At least on its face, the SVPA complies with authority emanating
from the U.S. Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court, and ap-
pellate courts in other states. The Hubbart court rejected challenges
to the SVPA on due process, equal protection, and ex post facto
grounds.' 5
Part One discusses the SVPA's substantial compliance with con-
stitutional directives but suggests that the case law on involuntary civil
commitment reveals a disturbing disregard by the judiciary for the ad-
vances and limitations of psychiatry. Although lawmakers and courts
employ medical jargon when it suits them, praising the SVPA's thresh-
old requirement of a "currently diagnosed mental disorder,"' 6 for ex-
ample, they deny that persons involuntarily committed under such
laws have a constitutional right to treatment.'7 In doing so, they give
their imprimatur to a scheme that allows sexual predators to be con-
fined without receiving any psychiatric care for the mental problem
that afflicts them.
A. Substantive Due Process
The California Legislature skillfully drafted the SVPA to comply
with U.S. Supreme Court and California precedent. Hence, the state
may involuntarily commit persons who pose a danger to others if its
interest in protecting the public outweighs the individual's interest in
freedom from confinement.' 8 Due process requires proof of danger-
ousness and a diagnosed mental impairment at the time that the per-
son is committed,' 9 though dangerousness may be expressed in terms
of probabilities.2"
15. See Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 587.
16. Id. at 597 (quoting CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE § 6600(a)).
17. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366; Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 602.
18. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1992); Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 592.
19. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
20. See Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 600 n.26 (collecting Supreme Court cases).
winter 19991
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1. Mental Impairment
In keeping with the strictures of Foucha v. Louisiana,2 ' which
held that confinement of an NGRI acquittee after he regained his san-
ity violated due process, sex offenders confined under the SVPA must
have "a diagnosed mental disorder," in addition to being "a danger to
the health and safety of others," at the time of their commitment.'
While the Kansas law upheld in Hendricks uses the term "mental ab-
normality," the SVPA defines "diagnosed mental disorder" almost ex-
actly the same way: "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the
emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to the
commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting.., a men-
ace to the health and safety of others."'  The heart of the controversy
is whether such disorders or abnormalities are bona fide mental ill-
nesses that can be cured by any known treatment. The nature of the
offender's mental condition assumes importance because Foucha es-
tablished that confining a person solely on the basis of dangerousness
offends due process. 4 Yet, the Foucha Court never reached the issue
of whether a personality disorder satisfies the mental illness require-
ment.' The Hendricks decision subsequently resolved the debate
over the meaning of mental illness by denying the authority of the
psychiatric profession to make legal determinations.2 6
Any definition lawmakers devise is likely to conflict with some
doctor's view. In a brief filed on behalf of Hendricks, the Washington
State Psychiatric Association argued that the term "mental illness" re-
fers to a "serious cognitive, perceptual or affective dysfunction," such
as schizophrenia, which "significantly impairs [the] person's ability to
function in ordinary life."27 By contrast, "mental disorders" listed in
21. 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (holding that, to satisfy due process, an insanity acquittee must
be released if the state cannot show that he is both mentally ill and dangerous).
22. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a) (defining a sexually violent predator as a
"person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims
for which he or she received a determinate sentence and who has a diagnosed mental
disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely
that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior."); see also § 6604 (jury
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a sexually violent predator).
23. Id. § 6600(c). See also KAN. STAT. AN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994).
24. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
25. See id. at 82. For a discussion of the limits of the Foucha opinion, see Hubbart, 969
P.2d at 597 (pointing out that, because Louisiana only contended that Foucha was danger-
ous, the Court did not rule on the meaning of mental illness).
26. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997) (declaring that disagreement in
the psychiatric community prevents the term "mental illness" from having any "talismanic
significance" for civil commitment laws).
27. WSPA Brief, 1996 WL 468611, at *5.
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-
IV"), including caffeine-induced insomnia and nicotine addiction, do
not constitute illnesses warranting involuntary confinement.'8 Some
psychiatrists consider the sexual urges and fantasies characteristic of
paraphilias to be "disorders," but not "mental illnesses," because they
do not impair "everyday functioning." 9 Rather, they result from in-
adequate impulse control or stunted moral development."
Several minority opinions have embraced the American Psychiat-
ric Association's (the "APA") definition of mental illness. For exam-
ple, the dissent in a Wisconsin case warned that if legislatures can
"define any deviancy they please as a mental illness... a state could
civilly commit whole categories of criminal offenders such as intoxi-
cated drivers merely by branding them deviant and designating them
mentally disordered."'" In the dissent's view, defining sexually violent
predators as a class of people whose mental disorders predispose them
to commit sexual violence is "entirely circular."32 The Western Dis-
trict of Washington found that this "unacceptable tautology" violated
due process,33 and a California Supreme Court Justice opined in her
Hubbart concurrence: "To the extent [that a] diagnosis [based on prior
offenses] simply places a psychiatric label on a particular character
structure or a generalized propensity to do ill, Foucha's warnings as-
sume more immediate constitutional significance. '34
While the APA accuses lawmakers of misappropriating medical
jargon to describe the behavior of sex offenders, more than a thou-
sand mental health professionals in the Association for the Treatment
of Sexual Abusers ("ATSA")-each of whom has dedicated at least
2,000 hours to the evaluation of sex offenders-contend:
Sex offender specialists are able to use the term "mental abnor-
mality" to identify a small subset of sex offenders who have spe-
cific paraphiliac disorders and who are at highest risk to
reoffend. The process for doing so is indistinguishable from the
28. See iL at **4-5.
29. Id at *22.
30. See id at **8-9; see also Brief For The American Psychiatric Association As Ami-
cus Curiae In Support Of Leroy Hendricks, 1996 W.L. 469200, at **24-25, Kansas v. Hen-
dricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (hereinafter "APA Brief') (concluding that "Hendricks
evidently suffers no incompetence to care for himself or to make rational decisions" and
that, while he wants to perform deviant sex acts and is willing to act on his desires, his
pedophilia involves no cognitive impairment).
31. State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 142 (Wis. 1995) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
32. Id at 143 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
33. See Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 749-50 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
34. Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 612 (Cal. 1999) (Werdegar, J.,
concurring).
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process used by mental health professionals to determine
"mental illness" in the ordinary course of civil commitment
proceedings.
Because there is no biomedical test for discovering the vast majority
of mental disorders, psychiatrists must rely on observations of their
patients' behavior and self-reporting.36 Thus, according to the ATSA,
attacking as "circular" reliance on past sexual violence to diagnose
present mental abnormalities "would basically dismiss all psychiatric
diagnoses."37
In the wake of Hendricks, distinctions grounded in psychiatry ap-
pear to lack legal force. The Supreme Court split five-to-four over the
ex post facto issue.38 Yet, in a surprising moment of unanimity, all
nine justices concluded that Kansas' requirement of "mental abnor-
mality," as opposed to mental illness, satisfied the Due Process
Clause.39 This consensus reveals the Court's distrust of medical sci-
ence as the basis for legal rules. To paraphrase Justice Thomas, the
term "mental illness" lacks "talismanic significance" because psychia-
trists disagree over its meaning.4" While the positions of the ATSA
and the APA reflect disagreement in the medical community, the
Court itself uses terms like "emotionally disturbed," "mentally ill,"
and "insane" interchangeably.4 ' For this reason, according to Justice
Thomas, legislatures enjoy the "widest latitude" in establishing the
bounds of civil commitment.42
2. Dangerousness
While courts refuse to defer to the psychiatric profession in defin-
ing mental disorders warranting civil confinement, they rely on state
medical experts to predict dangerousness-the other half of the
Foucha equation. Critics of involuntary confinement argue that as
35. ATSA Brief, 1996 WL 471027, at *9 (emphasis added).
36. See id. at *10.
37. Id. at *11.
38. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 348 (1997).
39. See id. at 357; see also id. at 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 373 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Breyer agreed that "[tjhe psychiatric debate... helps to
inform the law by setting the bounds of what is reasonable, but it cannot here decide just
how the States must write their laws within those bounds." Id. at 375 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
40. Id. at 359.
41. See id. California courts have agreed with this sentiment in the past. See, e.g.,
People v. Martin, 165 Cal. Rptr. 773, 779 (Cal. App. Ct. 1980) (stating that the term
"mental disorder" has a "demonstrably established technical meaning" and is not constitu-
tionally vague).
42. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360.
many as two-thirds of such predictions are erroneous;43 yet, the
Supreme Court has found forecasts of future criminality to be an es-
sential part of our judicial process.' The SVPA places the burden on
the state to show dangerousness at the probable cause hearing, the
trial, and any subsequent discharge proceedings4 5 -requirements that
have passed constitutional muster before the California Supreme
Court.46 The lower appellate court in Hubbart echoed earlier Califor-
nia holdings by asserting that "[t]he fact that psychiatric predictions
are imprecise... does not prevent society from protecting itself from
those who are dangerously mentally ill."14 7 In the same case, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court upheld the SVPA, even though the sexual of-
fenses serving as prognosticators of Hubbart's future conduct had
occurred many years in the past.48 In fact, under the SVPA, the of-
fender can be in prison for a wholly unrelated crime.4 9
B. Procedural Due Process
Like the Kansas law, the SVPA requires proof beyond a reason-
able doubt that the individual meets the requirements for classifica-
tion as a sexually violent predator.50 This evidentiary standard offers
greater protection than the preponderance of evidence standard man-
dated by the Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas,5 and it comports
43. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 378 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing this statistic in a case dealing with the extension of NGRI commitment); see also APA
Brief, 1996 WL 469200, at *18 ("[T]here is, in the area of psychiatric prediction of violence
by the mentally ill, nothing like the level of certainty applicable to contagious disease.").
44. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 897 (1983); see also State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d
115, 125 (Wis. 1995).
45. See CAl. WELF. & INsT. CODE §§ 6604-05.
46. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 589-91 (Cal. 1999).
47. Hubbart v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268,291 (Cal. App. Ct. 1997); see also
People v. Superior Court (Dodson), 196 Cal. Rptr. 431, 436 (Cal. App. Ct. 1983) (declaring
that the use of past conduct to predict future dangerousness is a "constitutionally valid
evidentiary consideration"); see People v. Martin, 165 Cal. Rptr. 773, 780 (Cal. App. Ct.
1980) (upholding the old Mentally Disordered Sex Offender law on the grounds that, inter
alia, "[t]he compelling interest in protecting society against sexually motivated injury and
in providing beneficial treatment for such disordered persons should not be sacrificed by
requiring a certainty of prediction which is currently impossible to obtain").
48. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268,293 (Cal. App. Ct.), affd, 969
P.2d 584 (Cal. 1999).
49. See CAL. WELl. & INs-r. CODE § 6600(a). Acceptable predicate offenses include,
inter alia, those committed before July 1, 1977, but conviction for past crimes cannot be the
"sole basis" for determination that the person is a sexually violent predator. See id.
50. See id. § 6604; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07.
51. 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (requiring clear and convincing evidence of both mental illness
and dangerousness for involuntary civil commitment). Explicitly denying the need for a
reasonable doubt standard, the Addington Court stated that:
Winter 1999] SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR ACT'
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with California precedents. 52 The SVPA provides that, absent a find-
ing beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a sexually violent
predator, he must be unconditionally released at the end of either his
prison term or parole period.53 The SVPA incorporates other proce-
dural safeguards, including the right to a jury trial, the right to assist-
ance of counsel, and a unanimous verdict.54 Although critics of other
sex offender laws typically assume that involuntary commitment lasts
a lifetime,' California offenders are committed for renewable two-
year terms. 6 They can petition for a discharge hearing after only
twelve months and, depending on the court's ruling, they may be re-
leased unconditionally or placed on conditional outpatient status.5 7
Moreover, the SVPA provides for annual examinations of the of-
fender's mental condition, at which he may retain an independent ex-
pert with access to all records.5" A procedural due process challenge
thus fails to invalidate the statute.
C. Equal Protection
Neither have persons involuntarily confined under the SVPA
presented a convincing equal protection argument. For example, the
Hubbart appellant contended that other involuntary confinement
schemes in California, such as the Mentally Disordered Offender Law
Within the medical discipline, the traditional standard of "factflinding" is a "rea-
sonable medical certainty." If a trained psychiatrist has difficulty with the cate-
gorical "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, the untrained lay juror-or indeed
even a trained judge-who is required to rely upon expert opinion could be
forced by the criminal law standard of proof to reject commitment for many pa-
tients desperately in need of institutionalized psychiatric care.
Id. at 430.
52. See People v. Feagley, 535 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1975) (holding that the Due Process
Clause of the California Constitution demands reasonable doubt standard for involuntary
commitment of persons under the old Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Law, former
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6300-30).
53. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604.
54. See id. § 6603 (right to jury trial, if requested, to determine suitability for civil
commitment; right to assistance of counsel, including court-appointed lawyer for indigent
offenders; right to unanimous verdict). The Legislature probably incorporated the unani-
mous verdict requirement, like the reasonable doubt standard, to comply with Feagley. See
Feagley, 535 P.2d at 381-82 (unanimous verdict necessary to satisfy federal and state Equal
Protection Clauses because persons involuntarily committed under another California law,
the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, enjoyed such guarantees).
55. See, e.g., Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 749 (W.D. Wash. 1995) ("Like the
scheme rejected in Foucha, the Statute here permits indefinite incarceration based on little
more than a showing of potential future dangerousness").
56. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604.
57. See id. § 6608.
58. See id.
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR ACT
("MDOL")5 9 and the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act ("LPSA")6 ° con-
tain more stringent provisions regarding dangerousness. 61 Amended
in 1989 to cure equal protection problems,62 the MDOL requires
mental health treatment as a condition of parole for persons deemed
to pose a "substantial danger of physical harm to others."'63 The
LPSA authorizes involuntary commitment of individuals who show a
"demonstrated danger of inflicting substantial physical harm."'
Neither law, however, mandates a finding of dangerousness that dif-
fers materially from that required under the SVPA. The "current"
mental disorder from which the sexually violent predator suffers must
make him "a danger to the health and safety of others." 65 As the
California Supreme Court recently noted, "[t]he statute does not per-
mit the trier of fact to conclude that the [sexually violent predator] is
currently mentally disordered and dangerous, even though he is not
likely to commit sexually violent crimes and does not pose a present
and substantial threat to public safety. ' 66 Although critics of involun-
tary commitment schemes disparage the intertwined definitions of
"dangerousness" and "mental disorder," 67 this tautology is not unique
to the SVPA, but afflicts the MDOL and the LPSA as well. Hence,
persons committed under the SVPA lack a compelling equal protec-
tion claim.
D. Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy
Detractors of involuntary civil commitment laws suggest that the
dearth of effective treatment for sexual predators demonstrates that
the laws were designed to serve penal ends. Revealing the statutes'
punitive nature is vital to the showing that they violate the ex post
facto and double jeopardy provisions of the Constitution. The Ex Post
Facto Clause, for example, prohibits only those laws which "retroac-
59. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2960.
60. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5300.
61. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 604 (Cal. 1999).
62. See People v. Gibson, 204 Cal. Rptr. 56, 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that an
older version of the MDOL violated equal protection because it subjected offenders to a
less rigorous standard of commitment than did similar California laws).
63. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2962(d)(1).
64. See CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE § 5300(a).
65. See id. § 6600(a), (c); Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 604.
66. Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 604.
67. See, e.g., id. at 1179-80 (Werdegar, J., concurring); Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp.
744, 749-50 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
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tively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for
criminal acts" and thus does not apply to purely civil schemes.6
Lawmakers' apathy toward the development of treatment strate-
gies constitutes the most disturbing aspect of the SVPA and similar
laws in other states. Criticizing the statute under which Hendricks
was committed, the Kansas Supreme Court noted, "The legislature
concedes that sexually violent predators are not amenable to treat-
ment .... If there is nothing to treat under [the Kansas statute], then
there is no mental illness. In that light, the provisions of the Act for
treatment appear somewhat disingenuous."69 Critics of the SVPA
raise similar objections. For instance, one detractor complained that
"[t]he Legislature has spoken out of both sides of its mouth. In one
respect, they've said there is no cure .... But now they're saying that
we shouldn't release them until they're cured. 70
Once confined in a mental institution under the California stat-
ute, the offender supposedly participates in a narrowly-tailored treat-
ment program.71 Although sections 6606(a) and 6606(c) say little
about the actual regimes to be implemented, they do instruct the State
Department of Mental Health to develop a protocol describing "the
number and types of treatment components that are provided in the
program. '72 The protocol must "specify how assessment data will be
used to determine the course of treatment for each individual of-
fender. [It] shall also specify measures that will be used to assess
treatment progress and changes with respect to the individual's risk of
reoffense."73
Sections 6606(a) and 6606(c) arguably give substance to the claim
that sex offenders will "be committed and treated for their disorders
only as long as the disorders persist and not for any punitive pur-
poses."74 The relative specificity of these provisions has not gone un-
noticed. The dissent in Hendricks recognized California for
mandating individual treatment and considering less restrictive alter-
natives for sex offenders.75 Yet the SVPA carefully refrains from
68. Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 605 (quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990)).
69. In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan.
1996), rev'd by Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
70. Mary Lynne Vellinga, Confinement Past Prison, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 3,1997, at
Al (quoting Michael Bowman, Sacramento defense attorney and opponent of the SVPA).
71. See CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE § 6606 (a), (c).
72. Id. § 6606(c).
73. Id.
74. S.B. 1143, 1995 Portion of 1995-96 Reg. Session (Cal. 1995); A.B. 888, 1995 Portion
of 1995-96 Reg. Session (Cal. 1995) (emphasis added).
75. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 389 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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promising a cure. Rather, "[a]menability to treatment is not required
for a finding that any person is a person described in Section 6600, nor
is it required for treatment of that person."'76
The California Legislature's refusal to guarantee a solution, or
even to require that people committed under the SVPA be amenable
to treatment, has withstood constitutional scrutiny by the California
Supreme Court.77 Indeed, courts have not usually required legisla-
tures to do more than assert a therapeutic purpose and make some
sketchy provisions for treatment. Two lower appellate courts in Cali-
fornia suggested that lack of amenability to treatment is of no conse-
quence to constitutional analysis.78 Justice Thomas went even farther
in Hendricks, declaring that "[w]e have never held that the Constitu-
tion prevents a State from civilly detaining those for whom no treat-
ment is available but who nevertheless pose a danger to others. 79
The California Supreme Court echoed Justice Thomas when it as-
serted in Hubbart that "there is no broad constitutional right of treat-
ment for persons involuntarily confined as dangerous and mentally
impaired, at least where 'no acceptable treatment exist[s]' or where
they cannot be 'successfully treated for their afflictions.' "80
The subtle difference between Hubbart and earlier California
opinions merits attention. While California judges previously excused
ineffective treatment, the Hubbart court came close to saying that the
State does not have to provide any treatment at all. The former posi-
tion makes sense if psychiatrists continue to search for therapeutic op-
tions. As the Washington Supreme Court noted, "[T]he mere fact that
an illness is difficult to treat does not mean it is not an illness."'" The
language of Hubbart and Hendricks presents cause for concern, how-
ever, for it embraces the state's police power while turning a blind eye
to the arguably pretextual nature of the treatment rationale.
76. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6606(b).
77. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 602 (Cal. 1999) ("[W]e disagree with
Hubbart's suggestion that the Act's treatment provisions are a sham, either because the
Legislature intended to withhold treatment or because it found that treatment was futile").
78. Hubbart v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268,292-93 (Cal. App. Ct. 1997), affd,
969 P.2d 584 (Cal. 1999); see also People v. Superior Court (Cain), 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, 302
(Cal. App. Ct. 1996), rev. granted, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 84 (1997) ("Given the current state of
psychiatry, a mental health commitment cannot be invalidated because the person commit-
ted may not ever be cured."); People v. Martin, 165 Cal. Rptr. 773, 778 (Cal. App. Ct.
1980) ("The state need not show that appellant will be cured; substantial improvement is
... a sufficient benefit").
79. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366.
80. Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 602.
81. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1002 (Wash. 1993).
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The California Supreme Court's affirmation of the SVPA must
not lull lawmakers into inertia. The unwillingness of the judiciary to
explore the interface between law and psychiatry represents an un-
pardonable oversight that will retard the development of a long-range
plan for combating sexual violence. As a matter of policy and consti-
tutional law, the state should not warehouse people in mental hospi-
tals if it has no funds or medical strategies to treat them. Calling upon
mental health professionals to assume custody of sex offenders impli-
cates the realm of medicine. And, contrary to the view of the Hen-
dricks and Hubbart courts, we must consider more fully the
implications of annexing a civil and curative regime to solve a criminal
law problem.
H. Treating Sex Offenders in California
Despite the Supreme Court's deference toward the states, indi-
viduals involuntarily committed to mental hospitals have a right to be
treated, even if they are unlikely to be cured. Although the civil-penal
distinction that legitimates the SVPA may turn out to be completely
hollow in practice, the solution lies not in striking down the law, but in
forcing the state live up to it. Part Two examines California's respon-
sibility for ensuring that the treatment provisions of the SVPA trans-
late into individualized therapy in the mental facilities to which sexual
predators are confined.
A. The Right to Treatment Beyond Kansas v. Hendricks
Many years ago, Judge Bazelon asked for legislative cooperation
in ensuring that the "right to treatment" takes concrete form in the
country's mental hospitals.8" He emphasized the importance of tailor-
ing treatment programs to the specific needs of each patient.83 He
also argued vigorously that "preventive detention demands standards
of procedural due process at least as high as in the criminal law."'& At
least on paper, the SVPA embodies both of these safeguards: (1) a
tough evidentiary burden on the state; and (2) provisions for individu-
alized therapy.8"
82. See David L. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 742
(1969).
83. See id. at 746.
84. Id. at 749.
85. It would be misleading to overstate the Act's compliance with the strictures of the
Bazelon article. Indeterminate confinement and reliance on predictions of dangerousness
are deeply antithetical to Bazelon's aspiration to "end involuntary commitments as a prin-
cipal response to mental illness." Id. at 753.
If the SVPA satisfies Judge Bazelon's procedural concerns, the
treatment issue poses deeper problems. Indeed, one of the most seri-
ous charges leveled at involuntary commitment laws is that bogus
treatment provisions mask legislative intent to turn hospitals into pris-
ons. Unfortunately, the rhetoric of lawmakers and prosecutors seems
to substantiate this view. For example, a Sacramento prosecutor ad-
mitted that "[s]hort of penile-ectomy, once a child molester, always a
child molester," but said he favors the SVPA because it is a valuable
tool to "get more time to lock up a person." 6 Sexual predators con-
fined under such laws in other states have rarely received any therapy
at all. For instance, the majority in Hendricks admitted that the re-
spondent was neither treated in jail before his civil commitment nor at
a mental facility thereafterY
Excusing Kansas' failure to treat Hendricks, the Supreme Court
argued that, under Youngberg v. Romeo, "states enjoy wide latitude in
developing treatment regimens."88 In Romeo, a profoundly retarded
adult man with violent tendencies was confined to a state hospital
upon the petition of his mother.8 9 His mother later sued, claiming
that her child received no training, or inadequate training, at the insti-
tution." Because Romeo suffered profound retardation, he could at
most learn to perform tasks like tying his shoes or using the restroom
by himself, skills that might reduce the frustration to which doctors
attributed his violent episodes.9' The respondent conceded that, con-
sidering the nature of her son's affliction, no amount of training would
make his release possible.92 According to the Supreme Court, Romeo
had a constitutional right to "minimally adequate or reasonable train-
ing to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint," but that the
judiciary must defer to the hospital's determination of reasonable-
ness.93 Moreover, the Court noted that states have "considerable dis-
cretion" in determining the nature of their responsibility to provide
86. See Vellinga, supra note 70. In a similar vein, Wisconsin Governor Tommy
Thompson speculated: "We might be able to use this civil commitment procedure to
keep ... [sexual predators] in jail." State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 139 (Wis. 1995) (Abra-
hamson, J., dissenting). A supporter of the Kansas law declared: "Because there is no
effective treatment for sex offenders, this Bill may mean a life sentence for a felon that is
considered a risk to women and children. So be it!" Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 385 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
87. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 353-54.
88. Id. at 368 n.4 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
89. See Romeo, 457 U.S. at 309.
90. See id. at 307.
91. See id. at 312 n.7.
92. See id. at 317.
93. Id. at 319 n.25, 321.
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training.94 Thus, rather than bolstering a federal right to treatment,
Romeo effectively conceded decision-making in this area to the states.
Because sexual predators are primarily confined under the state's
police power due to their dangerousness, they may have a shakier
right to treatment than incompetents such as Romeo.9 Sex offenders
can take care of themselves; they can eat, dress, drive cars, own
houses, and work at paying jobs. Unlike Romeo, they are not in
mental hospitals because they need help performing the basic func-
tions of life. However, precisely because the facts of Romeo are dis-
tinguishable, the Court should not use this case to support the
continued incarceration of sex offenders under the guise of therapy.
Given the SVPA's claims to provide individualized treatment, sex of-
fenders have a right to be treated, and the "reasonableness standard"
articulated in Romeo is too vague to ensure that California will re-
spect that right.
Instead, another line of cases more solidly supports the right of
sex offenders to treatment. In Rouse v. Cameron96 and Wyatt v.
Stickney,97two federal courts explicitly extended the right to treatment
to involuntary civil commitment. Rouse involved an insanity acquittee
warehoused indefinitely in St. Elizabeth's Hospital for the misde-
meanor of carrying a dangerous weapon.98 Rouse claimed that he had
not received any treatment at all.99 Similarly, in Wyatt, the guardians
of Alabama mental patients brought a class action suit against the
state hospital.'" After budget cuts eviscerated the hospital staff, leav-
ing only one clinical psychologist and three doctors with some psychi-
atric training for about 5,000 patients, treatment nearly ceased.' 0 '
The Wyatt court found that "absent treatment, the hospital is
transformed into a penitentiary."'" The hospital must first develop a
mission regarding the type of care it provided and the nature of the
people housed there.' 3 Second, it must fulfill the right to treatment
regardless of budgetary constraints. 4 Like the D.C. Circuit in Rouse,
94. Id. at 316.
95. See DAVID B. WEXLER, CRIMINAL COMMrrMENTs AND DANGEROUS MENTAL PA-
TmNTS: LEGAL IssuEs OF CONFINEMENT, TREATMENT, AND RELEASE 10 (1976).
96. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
97. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
98. See Rouse, 373 F.2d at 452.
99. See id.
100. See Wyatt, 325 F. Supp. at 782.
101. See id. at 784.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id.
the Alabama district court acknowledged that the dearth of trained
psychiatrists was "the most serious problem today in the care of the
mentally ill" and that the deficiency could not be remedied immedi-
ately.10 5 However, in its view, the rights that the patients asserted
were "present rights" which permitted no delay.106
Under facts analogous to involuntary civil commitment, the Ninth
Circuit has held that sex offenders confined under a "rehabilitative
rationale" have a right to individualized treatment. 07 The defendants
in Ohlinger v. Watson were serving indeterminate sentences in an Ore-
gon state penitentiary for molesting young boys.108 Oregon's indeter-
minate sentencing scheme for the sexual assault of children required
that the offender have a "mental or emotional disturbance, deficiency,
or condition" similar to that specified in the SVPA.10 9 Although the
petitioners participated in group therapy at the time of their appeal,
one of them had been incarcerated for ten years without receiving any
treatment. 10 The Ninth Circuit held that "[a]dequate and effective
treatment is constitutionally required because, absent treatment, ap-
pellants could be held indefinitely as a result of their mental illness,
while those convicted under the State sodomy statute need only serve
a fifteen year maximum term.""'
Two aspects of the Ohlinger requirements are notable. First, the
petitioners did not demand a cure for their mental disorders, but only
a treatment program that addressed their particular needs with "the
reasonable objective of rehabilitation.""' 2 Second, in harmony with
precedent outside the Ninth Circuit, the Ohlinger court stated that the
"[f]ack of funds, staff or facilities cannot justify the State's failure to
provide appellants with that treatment necessary for rehabilita-
tion.""' 3 The state violated these requirements, not only during the
ten-year period in which it provided no treatment, but also by offering
group therapy that psychiatric experts deemed ineffective." 4 By defi-
nition, group therapy does not constitute individualized therapy.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 777-78 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that "appel-
lant's indeterminate sentences for mental illness in lieu of the maximum criminal penalty
for sodomy makes their sentences analogous to civil commitment").
108. See id. at 776.
109. See id. at 776-77 n.2 (citing OR. REv. STAT. 137.111).
110. See iL at 776.
111. Id. at 778.
112. Id.
113. Id.; cf Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
114. See Ohlinger, 652 F.2d at 779.
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Moreover, in a prison culture, it may be actively detrimental and even
dangerous for prisoners to admit to pedophilia in the presence of their
peers.115
Despite Justice Thomas' hints to the contrary in Hendricks, the
deferential dicta in Romeo does not overrule the Ohlinger-Rouse-Wy-
att line of cases. The respondent in Romeo demanded "training" or
"habilitation," not "treatment."116 Moreover, the issue before the
Court was not total failure to provide training, but only whether ex-
isting modes ensured that the hospital would not unduly restrain Ro-
meo with devices like hand muffs." 7 Romeo should not apply if
California completely fails to treat sex offenders, as Kansas did before
Hendricks mounted his constitutional challenge. Moreover, reading
Romeo to favor the state's discretion to decide when and how to treat
sex offenders ignores a major difference between this case and the
sexual predator laws. Romeo was never punished for a crime. Thus,
his case did not require the Court to enforce the Double Jeopardy and
Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Constitution.
B. The Potential for reating Sex Offenders
Because so few sex offenders have actually been committed
under the SVPA, we can only speculate about how California's mental
health facilities will implement treatment protocols." 8 However, even
at this early stage, the Act surpasses the level of treatment provided in
Ohlinger or in the California state case People v. Feagley" 9 by guaran-
teeing that offenders will be treated in a hospital setting.
Feagley demonstrates how far California legislation in this area
has progressed.' 20 Feagley was incarcerated in the California Men's
115. See id. at 778.
116. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 326 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Admittedly, Justice Blackmun used the terms "treatment" and "training" almost inter-
changeably, stating at one point that he was "in accord with the Court's decision not to
address the constitutionality of a State's total failure to provide treatment under state law
to an individual committed under state law for 'care and treatment."' Id. (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
117. See id.
118. Only ten offenders had been committed as of February 3, 1997, due to the large
numbers of pending appeals. See Vellinga, supra note 70.
119. See People v. Feagley, 535 P.2d 373, 398 (Cal. 1975) (holding the old Mentally
Disordered Sex Offender ("MDSO") procedure unconstitutional because it amounted to
so complete a denial of treatment in a penal setting as to be deemed cruel and unusual
punishment).
120. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 603 n.29 (Cal. 1999) ("[T]he SVPA
does not, on its face, suffer from any of the flaws that supported a finding of cruel and
unusual punishment in Feagley.").
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Colony under the old MDSO law, the former California Welfare and
Institutions Code, sections 6300-6330.121 Like the Ohlinger defend-
ants, Feagley's treatment problems arose in a prison, not in a hospital,
and the Feagley court made much of this distinction. Under the
MDSO law, incurable patients were sent to "institutional units," a eu-
phemism for confinement at a prison facility where the sex offender
"mingled freely with the general prison population, wore standard
prison clothing, worked for wages of a few cents an hour in the prison
shop, submitted to full censorship of his mall, and was subject to all
prison regulations concerning security."' 22 Feagley allegedly received
no treatment at all. 23
Feagley's existence contrasted sharply with that of offenders
deemed likely to benefit from treatment, who were confined in the
state mental hospital at Atascadero. Patients at the state hospital en-
joyed the right to wear regular clothes; have access to telephones and
writing materials; receive visitors and mail; and refuse both lobotomy
and shock therapy. 24 These differences are significant because psy-
chiatrists believe that the prison environment reinforces sexual devi-
ance by exacerbating the offender's sense of inferiority. For example,
Dr. David G. Schmidt, then chief psychiatrist at San Quentin, opined
that "prison is a poor place to treat sick patients."'" Since sex offend-
ers often lack initiative, they fail to benefit from prison work pro-
grams and are often relegated to sweeping the jailyard or other menial
tasks. Other prisoners shun or assault them, and they may be tor-
mented by the guards for being "nuts and fruits, and sex fiends.' '1 26
The California Supreme Court decided Feagley in 1975, long
before the SVPA of 1996. Just as the SVPA overcomes the proce-
dural objections of Feagley, it also provides for housing of sex offend-
ers at the state hospital, rather than in prisons. 27 Although this step
does not ensure individualized treatment, it is a good start.
The most daunting barrier to the implementation of sections
6606(a) and (c) of the SVPA is the dearth of therapeutic options for
persons suffering from paraphilias and antisocial personality disor-
ders. The Act explicitly states that:
121. See Feagley, 535 P.2d at 374.
122. Md2 at 389-90.
123. See id at 390.
124. See id. at 391 n.20.
125. Id. at 393 n.25.
126. Id
127. See CAL. WEr.. & INsT. CODE § 6600.05.
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Amenability to treatment is not required for a finding that any
person... [is a sexually violent predator] nor is it required for
treatment of that person. Treatment does not mean that the
treatment be successful or potentially successful, nor does it
mean that the person must recognize his or her problem and
willingly participate in the treatment program.128
The salient features of this disclaimer are: (1) its lack of clarity about
how the state plans to treat potentially untreatable individuals; and (2)
its express rejection of the offender's right to refuse therapy. The for-
mer, which the courts have never properly examined, may be an ex-
ample of legislative chicanery; or it may be a practical
acknowledgment that, in the absence of a cure for sexual deviancy, the
law must allow mental health professionals to do the best they can.
However, even if the SVPA's treatment provisions were intended to
be a sham, they do not have to be implemented that way.
The psychiatric profession has long expressed skepticism about its
ability to treat sexual predators. For example, a study in the 1980s
suggested that California state hospitals were "inadequate for any-
thing but warehousing the sex offender." 129 Numerous articles and
monographs by American and European authors lament the dearth of
effective programs for treating sexual deviance,130 and neither organic
therapies, which can be administered coercively, nor milieu treat-
ments requiring the patient's cooperation have enjoyed much suc-
cess.' 3 ' More recently, the Hubbart appellant attached a letter from
Dr. Nadim Khoury, Deputy Director of the Health Care Services Di-
vision of the Department of Corrections, to his supplemental brief,
132
noting that the Department offers "no formal treatment programs
specifically designed for sex offenders" because no effective treatment
exists. 33
128. Id. § 6606(b).
129. Anthony D. Oliver, The Mentally Disordered Sex Offender: Facts and Fictions, 3
AM. J. FoRNsXc PsYcH. 87, 95 (1982-83).
130. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of
Mental Illness, 1 PSYCHOL., PuB. POL'Y & L. 534, 568, 571 (1995) (stating that neither
paraphilias nor antisocial personality disorders respond to psychotropic medication or
other organic treatments and that, without the cooperation of the sex offender, no thera-
peutic regimen will result in lasting changes); ALAN J. PALLONE, REHABILITATING CRIMI-
NAL SEXUAL PSYCHOPATHS 80-84 (1990) (surveying studies of unsuccessful sexual offender
treatment programs); Andrew Ashworth & Joanna Shapland, Psychopaths in the Criminal
Process, CRim. L. Rnv. 628, 632 (1980) ("many practitioners believe that psychopathic
disorders cannot be improved by any method they would term 'treatment"').
131. Winick, supra note 130, at 539.
132. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 610 n.37 (Cal. 1999). The California
Supreme Court refused to take judicial notice of the contents of this letter. See id.
133. Id.
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The bleak outlook for rehabilitating sex offenders has led some
writers to conclude that involuntary civil commitment should be im-
permissible. For instance, Professor Bruce Winick writes:
Although our understanding of treatability may change over
time as new treatment approaches are developed, a present dep-
rivation of liberty should not be constitutionally permissible on
the basis of a mere potential of future treatability. Unless a con-
dition is amenable to hospital treatment at the time involuntary
hospitalization is sought, due process should not permit depriva-
tion of liberty.' 34
Although it is grounded in an admirable concern for civil liberty,
Winick's position does little to protect women and children from re-
peat offenders. It also ignores new progress in treating sexual devi-
ancy. As the ATSA argued in its amicus brief on behalf of Kansas in
Hendricks, "[i]t is true that sex offenders cannot currently be 'cured.'
No cures exist for innumerable recognized medical and psychiatric
conditions (e.g. AIDS, diabetes, schizophrenia). There is increasing
evidence, though, that state-of-the-art treatment programs developed
over the last decade significantly reduce recidivism."'31 5 In a recent
article on civil commitment, Professor John Cornwell pointed to ad-
vances on two major fronts: (1) the development of cognitive-behav-
ioral programs with modest success in treating pedophiles and
exhibitionists; and (2) the use of pharmacologic agents, such as
medroxyprogesterone acetate to reduce male testosterone produc-
tion. 36 The latter development, called "chemical castration," seems
especially promising.
C. Chemical Castration and the Right to Refuse Treatment
The injectible form of medroxyprogesterone acetate, or Depo-
Provera,3 7 lowers male sex drives and curbs sexually violent behavior
in some types of offenders.' 8 The drug has been especially successful
when used on paraphiliacs who act out specific sexual fantasies. 3 9
The drug is less likely to help offenders who deny perpetrating sex
crimes, blame their conduct on non-sexual agents such as substance
abuse, or act on the basis of non-sexual feelings like anger and misog-
134. Winick, supra note 130, at 563 (emphasis added).
135. ATSA Brief, 1996 WL 471027, at *7.
136. See John Kip Cornwell, Protection and Treatment: The Permissible Civil Detention
of Sexual Predators, 53 WASH. & LEE L. Rnv. 1293, 1328 (1996).
137. Depo-Provera is manufactured by Upjohn.
138. See Edward A. Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration: MPA Treatment of the Sexual Of-
fender, 18 AM. J. CruM. L. 1, 3 (1990).
139. See id.
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yny.140 For paraphiliacs, Depo-Provera injections may reduce recidi-
vism rates to less than ten percent, in contrast to rates as high as fifty-
four to eighty-four percent for offenders released from prison without
treatment.'
41
In California, Depo-Provera treatment has recently become a dis-
cretionary parole condition for first-time child molesters and a
mandatory condition for repeat offenders. 42 The injections begin one
week prior to the prisoner's release and continue until the Depart-
ment of Corrections demonstrates that the treatment is no longer nec-
essary.1 43 The statute requires the physician to inform the person of
the drug's potential side effects, and the person may choose to un-
dergo surgical sterilization as an alternative. 44
Such a program would work better in the context of civil commit-
ment. Unlike the current chemical castration law, the SVPA reaches
insanity acquittees, as well as convicted persons.145 Moreover, ad-
ministering Depo-Provera in a hospital during an initial observation
period, such as the year preceding the right to petition for discharge
under the SVPA, facilitates better medical observation. Psychiatrists
could analyze the effects of the drug over time, gauge the patient's
willingness to accept the treatment, and monitor improvement before
conditionally releasing the individual as an outpatient. The provisions
allowing for conditional release under SVPA assume importance if the
mental facility embarks on Depo-Provera treatment, for the drug may
have a less discernible impact when the patient is secluded from wo-
men and children.
A civil commitment scheme calling for chemical castration of
mentally-disordered sex offenders should limit such treatment to men.
As at least one journal has noted, because Depo-Provera causes tem-
porary sterility in womien but not in men, the California parole condi-
tion may violate equal protection. 46 The Harvard Law Review
140. See id. at 4.
141. See Daniel L. Icenogle, Sentencing Male Sex Offenders to the Use of Biological
Treatments, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 279, 282, 288 (1994).
142. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 645.
143. See id. § 645(d).
144. See id. § 645(e)-(f).
145. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (a)-(b) (applying only to persons found guilty
of a conviction for sexual molestation) with CAL. WE.F. & INST. CODE § 6600(a) ("[A]
prior finding of not guilty by reason of insanity... shall also be deemed to be a sexually
violent offense even if the offender did not receive a determinate sentence for that prior
offense").
146. See generally, Harvard Law Review Association, Recent Legislation, California
Becomes First State to Require Chemical Castration of Certain Sex Offenders, 110 Hv. L.
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correctly contends that there is no valid medical justification for re-
quiring female offenders to submit to injections, since Depo-Provera
does not suppress the female sex drive but does prevent women from
becoming pregnant. 4 7 This is an important insight and a valid reason
for excluding women from the treatment. Although restricting Depo-
Provera injections to male sex offenders would also raise equal protec-
tion concerns,'14  distinctions between medically appropriate treat-
ments for men and women should survive intermediate scrutiny,
especially if an alternative treatment can be devised for women.
Under the intermediate standard, the law must "serve important gov-
ernmental ends, ' '1 49 a test easily met by a measure that protects wo-
men and children from sexual violence. Injecting men but not women
with a drug that lowers the male sex drive is "substantially related" to
these goals.'50
Although the equal protection problem can be remedied by limit-
ing Depo-Provera treatment to men, other constitutional challenges
present more formidable hurdles, even in the civil context. Both
Eighth Amendment and privacy-based arguments implicate the pa-
tient's right to refuse treatment and its corollary, the informed con-
sent doctrine-both of which have been acknowledged by federal
courts.15' Characterizing a measure as "treatment" does not shield it
from Eighth Amendment scrutiny, for courts may inquire into the pu-
REv. 799 (1997) (arguing that the chemical castration law is unconstitutional on equal pro-
tection grounds).
147. See id. at 801.
148. See id. at 804 ("A statute that used Depo-Provera to suppress only the male sex
drive would still treat men and women differently in that it would require male, but not
female sex offenders to submit to medical treatment.")
149. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (setting the intermediate standard of
Equal Protection review-i.e. that the law must be "substantially related" to the achieve-
ment of "important governmental ends").
150. See id.
151. See, e.g., Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that a patient
stated a civil rights claim based on the non-consensual administration of a fright drug dur-
ing his prison sentence); Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973) (concluding that
the non-consensual administration of a drug that induced vomiting violated the 8th
Amendment); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982)
(holding that the involuntary medication of patients who are mentally ill but not incompe-
tent to give consent is unconstitutional unless administered during an emergency); Rennie
v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), affd 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated 458
U.S. 1119 (1982), remanded to 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir 1983) (finding that the right to privacy
gives rise to a right to refuse any treatment that interferes with mental processes and vio-
lates bodily autonomy).
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nitive nature of a statute, even if its legislative classification is clearly
civil.152
None of the Eighth Amendment "right-to-refuse-treatment"
cases is factually on point, however. Indeed, the only Ninth Circuit
case to confront the right to refuse medication, Mackey v. Procunier,
can be distinguished from the use of Depo-Provera to treat sex of-
fenders. In Mackey, the California Medical Facility at Vacaville made
the petitioner a guinea pig for a breath-stopping "fright drug" which
was counter-indicated for fully conscious patients.153 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the petitioner had stated a claim "far beyond" malprac-
tice and remanded the case for further proceedings. 54
Both Mackey and an Eighth Circuit case, Knecht v. Gillman, in-
volved drugs that were either unusual or not recommended for the
purposes for which the state used them. In Knecht, the court noted
that "[t]here is no evidence that the drug is used at any other inmate
medical facility in any other state.' 1 55 The fright drug in Mackey and
the nausea-inducing apomorphine in Knecht also had harmful effects
which state medical personnel sought to inflict as part of an aversive
conditioning program.' 56 The inmates were punished for undesirable
behavior by medication that induced prolonged bouts of vomiting in
Knecht and paralyzing feelings of suffocation in Mackey.15 7
Chemical castration is neither inherently cruel, experimental, nor
likely to result in long-term side effects.' 58 The holdings of Mackey
and Knecht regarding experimental aversion therapies and their terri-
fying impacts thus do not govern Depo-Provera treatment. The FDA
has approved Depo-Provera, 59 and at least three states have adopted
it for use in treating sex offenders.161 Its primary physiological effect
152. See Knecht, 488 F.2d at 1138.
153. Mackey, 477 F.2d at 878.
154. See id. at 877.
155. Knecht, 488 F.2d at 1138.
156. See id. at 1137.
157. See id.
158. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (establishing a three-part test for deter-
mining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual under the 8th Amendment).
159. See Fred S. Berlin, The Paraphilias and Depo-Provera: Some Medica; Ethical, and
Legal Considerations, 17 BULL. AM. AcAD. PsYcmATRx & L. 233,235 (noting that doctors
can prescribe Depo-Provera under FDA guidelines).
160. See Atul Gawande, The Unkindest Cut: Science and the Ethics of Castration,
SLATE: MEDICAL EXAMINER, (last visited July 11, 1997) <http:llwww.slate.com/97-07-11/
medical examiner.asp> (reporting that California, Montana, and Florida allow, and in
some cases require, judges to order chemical castration for sex offenders). The article also
notes that the Czech Republic and Germany have introduced voluntary testosterone-inhib-
iting drug treatments. See id.
is a reduction in androgen levels in the blood stream. 161 In clinical
terms, the decrease in testosterone means a diminution in compulsive
sexual fantasies and a lowered sex drive in men. 6a Neither feminiza-
tion nor total impotence results, and reported side effects (including
muscle fatigue, cold sweats, elevated blood pressure, and weight gain)
cease as soon as the treatment ends. 63 Depo-Provera has no effect on
ability to procreate when administered to males.' 64
Although chemical castration survives Eighth Amendment scru-
tiny, it may implicate still other constitutional rights. Rennie v.
Klein165 and Rogers v. Okin166 carved out a right to refuse treatment,
except in emergency situations, by extending the privacy penumbra to
involuntarily-committed mental patients. Returning Rogers to the
First Circuit, the Supreme Court observed in dicta that "involuntarily
committed mental patients ... retain liberty interests protected di-
rectly by the Constitution... and that these interests are implicated
by the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs."' 6 7
Interestingly, however, both Rennie and Rogers displayed defer-
ence to the treatment decisions of state medical professionals, a trend
hastened by Romeo. Although the "right-to-refuse-treatment" deci-
sions gave mental patients penumbral protection against medication
that compromised their bodily autonomy, the due process holdings of
Rennie and Rogers stopped short of making judges the arbiters of psy-
chiatric treatment. The lower court in Rennie left the patient's appeal
to the discretion of an independent psychiatrist guided by four factors:
(1) the nature of the threat which the patient posed to the hospital
staff; (2) the patient's competence to decide whether he wanted treat-
ment; (3) the existence of less restrictive alternatives; and (4) the risk
161. Fitzgerald, supra note 138, at 5.
162. Cornwell, supra note 136, at 1331.
163. See, eg., Kimberly A. Peters, Chemical Castration: An Alternative to Incarceration,
31 Duo. L. REv. 307, 310 (1993) (discussing the potential side effects of chemical
castration).
164. See Fitzgerald, supra note 138, at 6, 44; Peters, supra note 163, at 311; see also
Steven A. Capps, Wilson Set to Approve Chemical Castration, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 28,
1996.
165. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.NJ. 1978), affd, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981),
vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (involuntary mental
patient sought to enjoin hospital from forcibly administering drugs to him in absence of
emergency).
166. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), affd in part, rev'd in part 634
F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982) (class action
of mental patients seeking to prevent forcible administration of drugs).
167. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. at 299 n.16.
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of permanent side effects from the proposed medication. 68 On re-
mand from the Supreme Court, a year after Romeo, the Third Circuit
held that the Constitution did not even require this neutral, nonjudi-
cial procedure. Rather, the hospital's treatment team and chief psy-
chiatrist could make the call. 69
Given the courts' reluctance to reverse the treatment decisions of
psychiatric professionals, chemical castration should not be held un-
constitutional in the civil context. Indeed, Depo-Provera treatment
satisfies two, and probably three, of the Rennie factors: (1) the of-
fender represents a menace, perhaps even to members of the hospital
staff; (2) Depo-Provera is an approved drug with no debilitating long-
term side effects; and (3) its potential for moving sex offenders to-
wards outpatient status makes it a less restrictive alternative than
either indeterminate criminal sentencing or permanent
hospitalization. 7 °
The reasons for seeking the patient's consent may be more medi-
cal than legal. Experts hypothesize that medications like Depo-
Provera have fewer beneficial effects if the offender does not volunta-
rily submit to them.1 7 ' Concerns about the efficacy of treatment, and
the fear of legal reprisals, have led many states, including California,
Pennsylvania and Texas, to require that doctors attempt to obtain in-
formed consent.1 72
However, this approach may ultimately frustrate the right to
treatment itself. Citing extreme cases like Kaimowitz v. Dep't of
Mental Health, 73 where the court found that a patient could not vol-
untarily consent to an experimental, irreversible, and highly danger-
ous psychosurgery about which his doctors had insufficient
knowledge, some commentators argue that the coercion inherent in
choosing between treatment and indefinite confinement makes in-
formed consent impossible.' 74 Such a view negates the ability of any
patient to assert his right to treatment.
168. See Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1145-48.
169. See Rennie, 720 F.2d at 270.
170. See supra notes 137-67 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 163, at 310 ("The pivotal criterion in calculating the
treatability of a sex offender is his acknowledgment that his conduct is intolerable and
beyond his control. Accordingly, therapists advocate that the only alternative for [offend-
ers who deny their conditions or are motivated by non-sexual impulses] is incarceration.").
172. See Loren H. Roth, The Right to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment: Law and Medicine
at the Interface, 35 EMORY L.J. 139, 152 (1986).
173. Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. of Wayne County, MI, July 10, 1973).
174. See WEXIER, supra note 95, at 17.
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The informed consent doctrine is especially pernicious in the in-
voluntary commitment context because it strips doctors of their au-
thority and turns them into custodians who can neither treat nor
release their patients. According to one study, an independent psychi-
atrist or review panel confirmed the need for treatment in ninety-
seven percent of all refusals by California mental patients. 75 Because
the most troubled individuals may be the least likely to submit volun-
tarily to beneficial procedures,'7 6 a rigidly-enforced right to refuse de-
creases the likelihood of their reintegration into society.
The SVPA's indifference to securing the understanding and coop-
eration of sexual predators with regard to psychiatric therapy looks
questionable in light of the "right-to-refuse-treatment" decisions.' 77
However, Youngberg v. Romeo has had a mixed legacy in this area.
While the Hendricks Court recently used Romeo to justify the lamen-
table dearth of treatment attending the Kansas sex offender act, Ro-
meo also provides a barrier against ill-considered efforts by patients to
refuse medical help. The Romeo Court's deference to state doctors
with regard to individual treatment decisions should extend to admin-
istration of Depo-Provera to involuntarily-committed sex offenders.
D. Some Conclusions about the Right to Treatment under the SVPA
The posture of the Hendricks Court with respect to the psychiat-
ric community merits notice. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas
deferred to state decisions about whom to confine and how much
money is available for treatment. 78 Citing Romeo, the majority indi-
cated that it will bow to psychiatric expertise only after offenders have
been moved from jails to hospitals.'79 At this stage, doctors may se-
lect treatments within budgetary limits defined by the state.180 Such a
position constitutes extreme deference to the face of the legislation
with little scrutiny of its impact.
If the judiciary continues to follow the spirit of Hendricks and
Hubbart, the SVPA will be spared, no matter how punitive its imple-
mentation may be. However, even if the California Legislature in-
tended to throw away the key to state mental institutions, the SVPA
175. See Roth, supra note 172, at 154.
176. See iL (citing California studies). Roth reports that persistent refusers tend to be
schizophrenic, psychotic or in denial about having a mental illness. See id.
177. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6606(b).
178. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 347 (1997).
179. See id. at 368 n.4.
180. See id
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does contain a rudimentary framework for individualized treatment.
This is an encouraging sign.
Federal "right-to treatment" decisions provide the means to en-
force the SVPA's therapeutic provisions. But will the courts accept
the burden of policing the right to treatment? The four dissenters in
Hendricks expressed concern, not only about the state's failure to pro-
vide therapy, but also about the need for less restrictive alternatives
.. 181cocrlike halfway houses and post-release supervision. In his concur
rence, Justice Kennedy gave qualified approval to the Kansas law,
suggesting that if "civil confinement were to become a mechanism for
retribution or general deterrence... our precedents would not suffice
to validate it."'" Given these sentiments, there is reason to hope that,
supervised by the courts, California will actually implement the treat-
ment provisions of the SVPA. And despite the pessimism of some
members of the psychiatric community, doctors continue to search for
new therapies, such as Depo-Provera injections, to reduce the recidi-
vism of sexual predators.
I. Sex Offenders and the Insanity Defense
By using medical discourse to facilitate the involuntary civil com-
mitment of sexual predators, the California Legislature has not only
resurrected an old debate about the tension between preventive de-
tention and the right to treatment; it has also intensified confusion
over the boundaries between madness and criminal responsibility. In-
deed, amendments to the SVPA passed soon after its enactment ex-
tend section 6600 to cases where a prior violent sexual offense charge
resulted in a finding of NGRI, as well as to prior convictions. 8 3 The
tensions between the SVPA and the legal definition of insanity impli-
cate an additional issue in this article: the best mode for dealing with
sex offenders who have not yet been convicted and sentenced.
Although the mental disorders afflicting many sexual predators
satisfy the requirements for extending confinement of NGRI acquit-
tees,'84 they fail to meet the state's reinvigorated test for legal in-
181. See id. at 387 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d
584, 612 (Cal. 1999) (Werdegar, J., concurring) ("The concrete facts of some future pro-
ceeding may force this or another court to confront the potential limits of the [SVP] Act.").
183. See Hubbart, 969 P.2d at 588 n.7.
184. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25.5(b) (codifying the M'Naghten "right and wrong" test
for the insanity defense). The standard for extending the confinement of an insanity ac-
quittee is codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.5 (providing that the extension of commit-
ment is appropriate if, "by reason of mental disease, defect, or disorder, [the person]
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sanity. Thus, the SVPA's involuntary commitment standard is
inconsistent with the insanity defense. To remedy this disjunction, the
California Legislature should create of a new legal category, applica-
ble in the guilt phase, which recognizes mental disorders that fall short
of insanity. In several states that have adopted it, this new category is
known as guilty but mentally ill or GBMI.
A. Inconsistencies in the Law
The notorious "Twinkie" defense raised by Dan White, the
assassin of San Francisco Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor
Harvey Milk, incited the wrath of California citizens and precipitated
the reintroduction of the M'Naghten test for legal insanity."8 5 White's
conviction was reduced from murder to manslaughter when he
claimed diminished mental capacity arising from the ingestion of junk
food.186 In response to the White case, outraged California voters
passed the Victim's Rights Bill in 1982, eliminating the diminished ca-
pacity or irresistible impulse defense.' 7 The Victim's Rights Bill also
required the accused to prove "by a preponderance of the evidence
that he or she was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature
and quality of his or her act and of distinguishing between right and
wrong at the time of the commission of the offense."
8 8
In 1994, further legislation excluded personality disorders from
the definition of insanity.'8 9 Yet, even under the less stringent Ameri-
can Law Institute test, the California Supreme Court had stated that
"if the defense expert can point to no symptom, no manifestation of
the defendant's condition, except repeated criminal or antisocial acts,
that condition cannot be considered grounds for finding the defendant
insane."'190 Section 25.5 of the California Penal Code codified a
represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others"). See also People v. Wilder, 39
Cal. Rptr. 2d 247, 253 (Cal. App. Ct. 1995) (finding that due process does not require the
standards for legal insanity and extension of commitment to be identical); People v. Supe-
rior Court (Williams), 284 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609 (Cal. App. Ct. 1991) (same).
185. See Vicki Torres, Insanity Plea Less a Bargain in the Courts: Tough Guidelines
Eclipse Era of Hinckley, White, SAN DIEGo UNION-T~m., Dec. 27, 1984 (discussing the
legislative fallout from Dan White's insanity acquittal in the Milk and Moscone murders).
186. See id. White was only sentenced to eight years in prison. See id.
187. See id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(a) ("The defense of diminished capacity is hereby
abolished).
188. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(b).
189. See id. § 25.5 ("[T]his defense shall not be found by the trier of fact solely on the
basis of a personality or adjustment disorder, or a seizure disorder, an addiction to, or
abuse of, intoxicating substances").
190. People v. Fields, 673 P.2d 680, 676 (Cal. 1983) (jury instructed on subdivision 2 of
the ALl test which provides that the jury may find the defendant insane if he lacks the
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stricter formulation of this exclusion, expressly prohibiting NGRI de-
fenses based on personality disorders.191 By implication, the re-
vamped insanity definition embodies the rule that "an irresistible
impulse to commit an act which [the defendant] knows is wrong...
does not constitute the insanity which is a legal defense. 1 92
In affirming the hospitalization of sex offenders who do not qual-
ify for the insanity defense, the courts have again run afoul the psychi-
atric community. According to the Hendricks majority, Kansas
properly extended involuntary civil commitment to "those who suffer
a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their con-
trol." 93 Yet, as the APA noted, the Kansas test for insanity is cogni-
tive, not volitional. 94 If Kansas had followed the APA's Guidelines
for Legislation on the Psychiatric Hospitalization of Adults,195 Hen-
dricks would not have been eligible for civil commitment. The APA
argued in its amicus brief:
The connection between the criminal standard and the standard
for permissible involuntary civil commitment under a parens pa-
triae power [and the NGRI test] is natural, if not inevitable: lack
of substantial responsibility for one's own actions has tradition-
ally been the central justification both for excusing criminal lia-
bility and for allowing state intervention for the parens patriae
purpose of taking care of "persons incapable of looking after
their own interests." Not surprisingly, an equation of the
"mental illness" standard for civil commitment and the criminal
law concept of insanity not only has historical roots but also has
sometimes been assumed by this Court. 196
Kansas law embodies a sharp dichotomy between general civil
commitment standards, which require incompetence, and the Kansas
sex offender act, which encompasses mental abnormalities. 97 By con-
trast, several California laws besides the SVPA have been challenged
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and conform his behavior to the re-
quirements of law) (footnote omitted).
191. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25.5.
192. People v. Morisawa, 178 P. 888, 888 (Cal. 1919) (rejecting the argument that a jury
instruction should have included an indication that, to be found guilty, the defendant had
to have the "power" or "volition" to act) (quoting People v. Hoin, 62 Cal. 120, 121 (1882)).
193. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 347 (1997).
194. APA Brief, 1996 WL 469200, at *13.
195. See id. at *22 (citing American Psychiatric Association's Guidelines for Legislation
on the Psychiatric Hospitalization of Adults, 140 AMER. J. PSYCH. 672 (1983) (proposing
that involuntary commitment should be contingent upon inability to "engage in a rational
decision-making process regarding... hospitalization or treatment") [hereinafter "APA
Guidelines"]).
196. Id. at *26 (citations omitted).
197. See id.
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because they apply to persons who could not have pled NGRI. In-
deed, the courts and the California Legislature have struggled with the
gray area between madness and badness for more than a decade. The
principal source of contention prior to the SVPA was the disparity
between standards for legal incompetence, insanity acquittal, and
commitment under the LPSA 198 and the MDOL.199
Both the LPSA and the MDOL apply to persons with mental dis-
orders. However, in contrast to the mental disorder requirement of
the SVPA, a "severe mental disorder" under the MDOL does not
include personality or adjustment disorders.2 "° The MDOL explicitly
targets offenders "about to be released on parole" and, before the
legislature amended it in 1989, it did not require a finding of present
danger to others.2° ' In 1988, a California appellate court found that
the old MDOL violated the Equal Protection Clause by subjecting the
appellant to "a commitment standard more lenient and a release stan-
dard more stringent than that required for the involuntary commit-
ment and treatment of any other mentally disordered person in
California. ' 2 2 The court in People v. Gibson also noted the irony of
committing people under the MDOL when they were legally sane for
the purposes of sentencing. 0 3 The legislature responded to the Gib-
son ruling by enacting urgency legislation, effective July 27, 1989, re-
quiring proof that the mentally disordered predator "represent[ ] a
substantial danger of physical harm to others."2 0 4 Because the SVPA
demands proof of dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt, it meets
one of the chief objections to the old MDOL. However, the dishar-
mony with the NGRI defense has not been remedied. In fact, the
California Legislature amended the SVPA to clarify that an sexually
violent predator may be someone found NGRI of a sexually violent
offense.20 5
198. See CAL. WEuF. & INsT. CODE §§ 5150,5200,5250(a), 5300(a)-(c). The LPSA pro-
vides for 180 days of confinement for an individual who was taken into custody for in-
flicting or attempting to inflict physical harm upon another, or who inflicted or attempted
to inflict such harm while in custody for evaluation and treatment. The Act requires that
the person present "a demonstrated danger of substantial physical harm to the others" as a
result of a "mental disorder." See id. § 5300.
199. See id. § 2962.
200. See People v. Superior Court (Myers), 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 38 n.7 (Cal. App. Ct.
1996).
201. See supra notes 62 & 63 and accompanying text.
202. People v. Gibson, 252 Cal. Rptr. 56, 63 (Cal. App. Ct. 1988).
203. See i& at 1430 n.5.
204. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2962(d)(1) (West 1999); see also Superior Court (Myers), 58
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 35.
205. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 608 n.34 (Cal. 1999).
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The Supreme Court decision in Foucha complicated the relation-
ship between insanity findings in the guilt phase and other mental
health determinations by conflating the standards for criminal and
civil commitment. By requiring present mental illness for the exten-
sion of an NGRI commitment, Foucha destroyed the boundary sepa-
rating insanity acquittees from dangerous-but-sane persons confined
under civil statutes. 20 6 Before Foucha, courts assumed that the civil
standard should be higher because predictions of future dangerous-
ness are less certain than confinement based on the past crimes of an
NGRI acquittee °7 The dissent said of the negative ramifications of
Foucha:
Because the majority conflates the standard for civil and crimi-
nal commitment, treating this criminal case as though it were
civil, it upsets a careful balance relied upon by the States, not
only in determining the conditions for continuing confinement,
but also in defining the defenses permitted for mental incapacity
at the time of the crime in question.20 8
The enactment of the SVPA in 1996 thus came at a time when the
distinction between mad and bad was especially confused, and the
SVPA intensified the uncertainty by encompassing both convicted
persons and NGRI acquittees.
B. Guilty But Mentally Il: A Middle Road Between Mad and Bad
Conservative voices such as Justices Thomas and Kennedy often
deny the authority of the medical profession to make legal determina-
tions. This effort to divorce law from science is ironic in the case of
sex offender commitments which depend upon proof of a mental dis-
order. The courts are equally wary of the mental profession's influ-
ence on findings of guilt or innocence. For example, Justice Kennedy
206. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1997) (holding that an insanity acquittee
who no longer had mental illness was no longer legally insane and thus could only be
committed under constitutional protections applicable to civil proceedings); see also iL at
89-101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (complaining that the Foucha majority opinion silently
overruled Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365-69 (1983)). Justice Kennedy disagreed
with the majority's conflation of the civil and criminal standards on the grounds that:
Present sanity would have relevance if petitioner had been committed as a conse-
quence of civil proceedings, in which dangerous conduct in the past was used to
predict similar conduct in the future. It has no relevance here, however. Peti-
tioner has not been confined based on predictions about future behavior but
rather for past criminal conduct.
Id. at 97-98.
207. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 368 (noting that "insanity acquittees constitute a special class
and should be treated differently from other candidates for commitment").
208. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 102 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
criticized the Foucha Court for failing "to recognize or account for the
profound differences between clinical insanity and state-law defini-
tions of criminal insanity. It is by now well established that insanity as
defined by the criminal law has no direct analog in medicine or
science." 20 9
The stark division between law and psychiatry presents the jury
with an all-or-nothing decision at the guilt phase: the defendant either
can or cannot distinguish between right and wrong. The APA's re-
solve to separate treatable and potentially untreatable persons has
similarly bad effects. People who have mental problems but recognize
the evil and savagery of their acts and those people with afflictions for
which there is no certain cure fall into the cracks of our legal system
and, when they emerge, their recidivism often exacts a horrifying
price.
In recent years, however, at least thirteen states have acknowl-
edged a gray area between madness and badness by a creating a new
criminal verdict, GMBI.210 GBMI statutes allow juries to hold the de-
fendant responsible for his crime but recognize that he has a mental
problem warranting treatment. At sentencing, the statutory maxi-
mum term may be imposed, thus ensuring that the label of criminal
culpability is more than symbolic.
According to one author, states with GBMI verdicts fall into two
categories. 21 1 Alaska, Kentucky, and South Carolina place primary
emphasis on treatment. In these states, a defendant found GBMI first
goes to a mental institution for therapy, finishing his prison sentence
only after he completes the treatment program. This model addresses
concerns that delaying treatment until after imprisonment is sympto-
matic of an underlying indifference to the offender's clinical pro-
209. Id. at 96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
210. Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, Ne-
vada, New Mexico. Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah have GBMI
statutes. See ALASKA STAT., § 12.47.040 (1990); DEL. CODE. ANN., tit. 11, §§ 401(b), 408
(1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (1985); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, 115-2(b)
(Smith-Hurd 1990); IND. CODE § 35-36-2-3 (1982); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 504.120
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); Mtc. COMP. LAWS § 768.36 (1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-
14-312 (1993); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 174.035 (Michie 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3
(Michie 1984 & Supp. 1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 314 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20
(Law Co-op 1985 & Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-7-2 (Michie 1998); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 77-13-1, 77-16a-102 (1993).
211. See Mark A. Woodmansee, Student Article, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict:
Political Expediency at the Expense of Moral Principle, 10 NoTRE DAME J. L. Ermcs &
PuB. POL'Y 341, 358 (1996).
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gress.212 The second and larger category of states seems more
interested in punishment; psychiatric care is provided only as the De-
partment of Corrections deems necessary. 213 However, in both types
of jurisdiction, lay factfinders who determine the individual's mental
state at the time of the offense may allow rehabilitative goals to guide
their choice of GBMI, instead of guilty.
214
Opponents of the GBMI verdict offer some predictable argu-
ments. Chief among them is the paternalistic assumption that juries,
confused by the new legal jargon, will fail to return NGRI decisions
for the genuinely insane.215 Note, however, that in some states a de-
fendant must plead insanity in order to be found GBMI; conse-
quently, individuals who hope to receive the middle sentence of
GBMI may end up being acquitted on insanity grounds. Studies indi-
cate that GBMI statutes have actually increased the number of in-
sanity acquittals in a few states, 216 and although the data is
inconclusive, the idea that GBMI has killed the insanity defense ap-
pears to be unfounded.
Another concern involves the possibility that legislative provi-
sions for treatment are nothing more than a pretext. Just as sections
6606(a) and 6606(c) of the SVPA must be adequately funded if invol-
untary commitment is to be therapeutic rather than punitive, the
GBMI verdict serves no purpose without bona fide treatment. The
allegation that the rehabilitative aims of GBMI are a sham finds sup-
port in statistics about the statutes' implementation. For example,
supporters of the verdict admit that, in Michigan in the 1980s, seventy-
five percent of all GBMI defendants received no therapy at all, and a
significant portion of the rest were examined only sporadically.217
212. Several courts have questioned the belated nature of the therapy provided under
involuntary civil commitment statutes, for example. See, e.g., Young v. Weston, 898 F.
Supp. 744, 752 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
213. See Woodmansee, supra note 211, at 358.
214. See Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose
Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 494, 518 (1985).
215. See, e.g., Woodmansee, supra note 211, at 364-68.
216. For example, the frequency of insanity acquittals after the implementation of the
GBMI verdict increased in Illinois, but decreased in Alaska and Georgia. See Slobogin,
supra note 214, at 506.
217. See Ira Mickenburg, A Pleasant Surprise: The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict Has
Both Succeeded in its own Right and Successfully Preserved the Traditional Role of the
Insanity Defense, 55 U. Cn. L. REv. 943, 992 (1987) (citing Smith & Hall, Evaluating Mich-
igan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study, 16 U. MIcH. J.L. REFoRM 77, n.
137 (1982)).
Many states in which treatment is discretionary have completely ne-
glected to fund psychiatric programs.218
One writer emphasizes the symbolic power of the GBMI verdict
in allaying public fears about feigned madness.2 19 Yet, while citizens
often blame recidivism on the insanity defense, the problem more
likely stems from shortcomings in parole and post-acquittal supervi-
sion. The value of the GBMI verdict, combined with longer criminal
sentences, inheres not in its negligible effect on the insanity defense,
but in its utility in earmarking legally-sane but mentally-disordered
offenders for a combination of punishment and therapy. This poten-
tial will remain unrealized until legislatures, courts, and psychiatric
professionals make a concerted effort to develop adequately-funded
and scientifically-sound treatment protocols.
Conclusion
In the struggle against sexual violence, proponents and detractors
of involuntary civil commitment have failed to bridge the gap between
psychiatry and law. Courts and legislatures deserve blame for in-
venting a medicalized rationale for shuttling dangerous criminals to
mental facilities and then denying the authority of the psychiatric pro-
fession to shape legal definitions. Similarly, doctors anxious to pre-
serve resources for other mental patients have been too reluctant to
explore avenues of treatment, such as Depo-Provera, which may ben-
efit sexual predators.
With regard to sexual predation, the public's fear of recidivists
admittedly approaches hysteria. It is doubtful that legislators would
go to similar lengths to address the compulsive behavior of kleptoma-
niacs or arsonists. Yet, the Equal Protection Clause "does not require
the State to choose between attacking every aspect of a public danger
or not attacking any part of the danger at all."'22 As a California
court recently observed, it is difficult to believe that our Constitution
"was intended to preclude the institutionalization and treatment of...
[a child molester whose] mental disorder causes him to have and even
to announce his unwavering determination to attack the first child un-
fortunate enough to cross his path after his release."22' Although pre-
218. See id. at 992 & n. 236 (offering Georgia as an example).
219. See id, at 977, 994.
220. In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 151 (Larson, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
221. Garcetti v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420, 434 (Cal. App. Ct.) (footnote
omitted), rev. granted, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 84 (Cal. 1997).
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dicting future violence on the basis of past sex crimes is fraught with
uncertainty, the SVPA's critics offer no protection against individuals
like Earl Shriner, who spent the last days of his prison term drawing
blueprints for an elaborate mobile torture chamber for children.222
Consecutive or indeterminate sentences and more intensive prison
treatment programs cannot accomplish the chief aim of the SVPA and
its counterparts outside California-preventing the recidivism of sex
offenders currently nearing the end of their criminal sentences.
The approach suggested in this article is two-fold. First, Califor-
nia's Sexually Violent Predator Act should continue to be upheld un-
less the state refuses to respect the offenders' right to treatment.
Reciprocally, the right to refuse therapies approved by the medical
community must be drastically circumscribed to prevent seriously dis-
turbed individuals from hampering their own rehabilitation. Second,
the use of medical discourse.for legal ends requires consistency in all
stages of an offender's progress through the courts. If involuntary
civil commitment statutes recognize a middle ground between mad-
ness and badness, the jury must have the option of doing the same
when it returns a verdict. Discretion to order therapy for guilty but
mentally ill defendants must not devolve into indifference. Like the
treatment provisions bolstering the SVPA, the GBMI laws will be
stronger if the courts demand that legislators put their money where
their rhetoric is.
222. See Fujimoto, supra note 4, at 882.
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